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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes the legislative history of the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977, and the regulations promulgated by the Federal
banking supervisory agencies. Nine applications by banks and their
challenges by community groups are examined, one in detail. These cases
show that community advocacy groups have an important role in enforcing
the Act, although community group involvment is not always necessary.
Negotiated settlements as well as challenges are possible under the CRA,
and produce different results. The Federal agencies charged with
implementing the Act appear to have different standards of enforcement.
Finally, some of the possible prospects of the CRA are considered. Of
these, the economic climate and electronic funds transfer would seem to
the greatest impact on the future of. the CRA.
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6CHAPTER ONE
The lack of mortgage and other credit in a neighborhood is fre-
quently pointed to as a factor contributing to neighborhood decline.
Community activist groups accuse banks of refusing sound loans in certain
poor, minority, or changing neighborhoods. This practice has been termed
"redlining," and while banks may deny its existance, community groups
maintain otherwise, and have lobbied for legislation forbidding it.
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) was intended to address
the redlining issue. It declares that financial institutions have "a
continuing and affirmative obligation to meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered,"2 and requires the
Federal agencies in charge of financial institutions to examine bank
lending practices and records. Fulfillment of bank obligations, as
reflected in their records, is determined by the agencies and is used as
one of the criteria in decisions of whether to approve applications for
bank acquisitions or expansions.
As the first year of the CRA's implementation ends, it is important
to study how the Act has been used. How has it been implemented, and
what have been the results? Because it is difficult to determine in
general how banks may be adjusting their policies to comply with the CRA,
this paper will examine closely the most visible aspect of the enforcement
and compliance process: application challenges and their outcomes.
These challenges demonstrate to all concerned how community groups use
the CRA, and how Federal agencies have chosen to interpret the Act and
banks respond to it. Thus these early application challenges have
7helped to clarify the role and expectations of each actor, while also
defining the scope of the Act and illustrating its limits.
This paper will examine several application challenges in an attempt
to understand how the CRA is working. An analysis of the community
complaints, bank responses, and regulatory agency decisions will do much
to explain how the CRA is used, and will provide background for others'
involvement with the CRA. It is not too early to begin, as well, to
evaluate how effectively the CRA has worked to halt redlining.
I will begin the paper with a discussion of the Act itself: its
legislative history, the regulations and their writing, and the
assumptions and expectations about the CRA. This is done not only to be
inclusive, but because the details of these matters can be importnat in
any litigation.
Provisions of the Act
Acting in their finding of the banks' "continuing and affirmative
obligation," the Congress in Section 804 of the Act indicates how it is
to be fulfilled:
... the appropriate Federal supervisory agency shall--
(1) assess the institution's record of meeting the credit
needs of its.entire community, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institution; and
(2) take such record into account in its evaluation of an
application for a deposit facility by such institution.
The financial institutions covered by the CRA and their Federal
supervisory agencies are:
8Federal savings and loan accociations, regulated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB);
National banks, supervised by the Comptroller of the
Currency (COC);
State-chartered trust companies that belong to the Federal
Reserve System, regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB);
those that are federally-insured but not members of the FRS
are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC);
Savings banks (thrifts) Shat are insured by the FDIC are
regulated by it as well.
Applications that require consideration of CRA performance are those
for permission to
* open a branch office
* relocate a home or branch office
* acquire or merge with a regulated institution
* receive Federal deposit insurance
* become Federally-chartered.
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The reader should be aware of the gaps in coverage by the Act.
State-chartered savings and loans that are not members of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC) are not covered by the CRA; nor
are non-FRS of -FDIC state banks or any credit unions. These kinds of
financial institutions contain % of the nation's total deposits.5
Also, in the states which prohibit branch banking, only mergers and
acquisitions are covered by the CRA.6
If this is all the Act says, why are the banks complaining of
compliance burdens and community groups hailing it as a wonderful tool?
Before discussing how the CRA is being used, we should examine what the
Congress intended the Act to accomplish and how the regulations
interpreted Congressional intent.
9Legislative History
While the traditional focus of Federal banking regulation has been
matters of bank "safety and soundness," the CRA is the latest in a series
of laws passed by the Congress that subject credit extension to Federal
oversight. The thrust of these new laws has been in the areas of con-
somer and civil rights, but even in these instances, the rationale for
Federal involvement is couched in traditional values: the findings of
the Congress in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) include the
reasoning that "Economic stabilization would be enhanced and competition
amoung various financial institutions.. .would be strengthened by an
absence of discrimination..." 7 Even after the fairly tough language
contained in Sec. 302(a) of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
The Congress finds that some depositary institutions
have sometimes contributed to the decline of certain geo-
graphic areas by their failure pursuant to their chartering
responsibilities to provide adequate home financing to
qualified applicants on reasonable terms and conditions...
the Congress hastened to add that "nothing in this chapter is intended
to... encourage unsound lending practices." 8
These divergent perspectives are reflected in the CRA. While
wishing to continue to push the banks to recognize and fulfill community
credit needs, the Congress still maintained that such activities were to
be "consistent with safe and sound operation." 9
The CRA was introduced by Senator Proxmire (D-Wisc.) on 19 January
1977 as S.406--a bill "to encourage financial institutions to help meet
the credit needs of the communities in which they are chartered, and for
other purposes," (bill title). The original bill had the same findings
and definitions as the final version, but also contained the concept
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of Primary Savings Service Area (PSSA--defined as a contiguous and compact
area where at least 50% of deposit customers reside),10 and related all
bank reinvestment activity to it. Banks seeking deposit facilities
were required to
* demonstrate how credit needs were being met in current
PSSA's, and
* delineate the PSSA of the proposed branch; analyze how
the bank plannied to meet the credit needs of that area;
and, indicate what proportion of deyysits received in the
new PSSA would be reinvested there.
Hearings on the bill were held before the Senate committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (of which Proxmire is chairman) on
23-25 March 1977.12 Ralph Nader, Gale Cincotta of National People's
Action, the Massachusetts and Connecticut state banking commissioners,
and some bankers testified in support of the bill, a few offering
strengthening amendments.
The Federal banking regulatory agencies all expressed agreement with
the goals of S.406, but declined to support it, citing possibly adverse
consequences, or objecting as did Arthur Burns of the FRB, to the
implication of credit allocation. (Credit allocation is the mandating
of certain types or- amounts of credit to certain areas, a practice which
is strongly resisted by bankers.) Increased paperwork, statuatory
duplication of administrative discretion and the recently-enacted HMDA,
and the separation of loan and deposit markets were all given as reasons
by the banking trade organizations for their opposition to S.406.
In the end, the CRA was not approved as an independent bill. Indeed,
it appears that it would not have passed had it not become a title
of the 1977 Housing and Community Development Act. In the Senate
11
debate to delete the CRA provisions from the larger bill, Senator Morgan
(D-N.C.) gave this account of the circumstances by which the CRA vas
added:
But during the markup of the housing bill (S.1523), which
we are now considering, the Banking Committee voted to attach
an amended version of S.406, the Community Reinvestment Act,
to the housing bill.
I might add by way of emphasis that I did not have the
privilege of being present at the time the housing bill was
marked up, inasmuch as I was hospitalized at the time.
However, I would add that later on, after I was able to return
to the committee, we did reconsider the vote by which this
section was added to the housing bill and b- my recollection
the vote was 7 to 7. Therefore, it being a j~e, the motion
failed and the section remained in the bill.
The amended version to which Morgan referred contained several
majr cang~o14major changes.14 This version clarified the bill's intent to have the
banking regulators, as part of their regular bank examination, assess
a financial institution's record of meeting community credit needs.
This decision to remove the original bill's reporting requirements and
"piggyback" the CRA onto the regular examination procedures was a recog-
nition that the reports would have been largely duplicative of the HMDA's.
Reference to PSSA's was retained, but the banks were no longer required
to submit information regarding proposed PSSA's in their deposit facility
applications: rather, the banking regulators were to use their assessment
of the institutions' records on meeting only current PSSA's credit needs
as a factor in evaluating applications for deposit facilities. Also
removed was a directive that Federal agencies "permit and encourage"
community groups to testify at deposit application hearings.
The debate to delete the CRA from the housing bill focussed on
the appearance of credit allocation and the anticipation of increased
bank paperwork. Early in the debate, Morgan declared the bill was,
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"...if not the first step toward the allocation of credit, or the require-
ment of allocation of credit by lending institution in America, it cer-
tainly was a foot in the door."15 Senator Sarbanes (D-Mary.) countered
by stating:
There is nothing in this legislation that is going to require
any lending institution to take any risks that are inconsistant
with or contrary to the safe and sound operation of the insti-
tution.. 1 6This legislation is extremely sensitive to that
concern.
Proxmire pointed out that the conference committee had "deleted from
the bill all reporting requirements. We said it would be necessary for
regulatory bodies to rely on the information they already have..." 1 7
The move to delete the CRA from the housing bill was defeated 31 to 40.
The final version of the Housing and Community Development Act,
with the CRA as one of its titles, was approved in the Senate on
1 October 1977. The further changes in the CRA are explained in this
exchange between Morgan and Proxmire:
Mr. Morgan:...Will the Senator explain to me the difference
between the community (Re)Investment Act as we agreed to it
earlier in the Senate and that which the conference committee
agreed to?
Mr. Proxmire:...What this legislation does, in contrast to
what passed, is to delay implementation for 390 days... .It
also redefines the primary service area to be served on a
broader basis, so there is no question that it is not simply
the immediate community where thI 8bank is located. These are
the two principal modifications.
President Carter signed the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977,
containing Title VIII--the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977-- into law
on 12 &tober 1977.
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Regulations
The banking regulatory agencies began to plan a set of joint hearings
in preparation for implementation of the CRA, scheduled to begin in
November, 1978. Included among the item on which the Agencies invited
opinions were
* how the terms "low- and moderate-income communities" and
"1credit needs", mentioned in the Act, were to be defined;
* if community outlines were to be determined by political
boundaries, such as city limits or SMSA's, or by economic
considerations such as bank trading areas;
* should the same CRA assessment standards be applied to all
Federally-regulated financial institutions regardless of
which supervisory agency is in charge or the size of the
institution;
* can an institution specialize in the type of credit it offers
and, how is an institution's record to be assesygd when it is
just one of several institution in a community.
Even though Senator Morgan proposed, and Senator Proxmire toyed
with agreeing to, a deletion of Sec 806--the requirement for Federal
banking regulatory agencies to draw up implementing regulations,20
the above short list of question faced by the Agencies gives an indication
of the issues raised by the wording of the Act.
The proposed regulations, released on 30 June 1978,21 indicated
that the main thrust of the Agencies was to encourage communication
between banks and members of the community about the need for, and
availability of, credit:
The Agencies believe that it is more likely that community
credit needs which can be met on a safe and sound basis will
be met when members of the community are aware of the avail-
ability of credit, the lending institutions are well informed
about community credit needs, and such institutions make a
sincere effort to meet those needs.
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Moreover, the Agencies stressed that they would not dictate how the
institutions were to meet their CRA responsibilities:
The regulations.. .would not require institutions to offer
particular kinds or amounts of credit... (the regulations)
preserve to every institution the flexibility necessary to
operate in a safe and sound manner, and to serve the con-
venience and ngds of its community effectively and
imaginatively.
The CRA Statement
As the means to force a financial institution to consider where it
thought its "community" lay and what types of credit it was prepared to
extend there, the proposed regulations required the adoption and annual
review of a "CRA Statement" by the board of directors. The Statement,
which would be available to the public, would include the institution's
delineation of its community and credit services. Additional information
the institution considered "helpful in describing how its efforts...
relate to meeting types of credit needed by its community" could be
included in the Statement.2 3
The Agencies indicated that they would consider whether to exempt
institutions located outside SMSA's with less than $10 million in assets
from the Statement requirement, but the solicitation for comments on the
matter was prefaced by these words:
The Agencies believe that institutions are aware of the areas
they serve and have well-articulated loan policies. The
Agencies, therefore, believe that adopti2 of a CRA Statement
would not be burdensome to institutions.
Two methods for determining a financial institution's entire com-
munity were outlined:
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a) using as boundaries those of the SMSA or county, with
adjustments for geography or large size of area
b) using the effective lending territory--that area around
each office where a bank makes most of its loans and all
equidistant points, with similar adjustments as in (a)
permitted.
Besides these two methods, any other reasonable rule for outlining the
entire community could be used by an institution. In any case, low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods could not be gerrymandered out an
institution's community, nor could the delineation be so general
25that it obscured the focus on local communities.2 -
In addition to the community outline, the CPA Statement was to con-
tain a list of specific types of credit it was prepared to make
available in that community. In the general category of residential
loans, for example, the Statement was to indicate the sub-categories
"mortgages for 1 to 4 dwelling units" of "home improvement loans" if
offered.
CRA Statements from the two most recent calender years were to be
kept in a public file, along with all CRA-related comments received by
the financial institution during that time.
The final regulations did not allow any exemptions from the
requirement for a CRA Statement. In addition, they prescribed the
text of a public notice required to be posted in all bank lobbies. The
notice stated that a CRA Statement could be obtained there, that comments
on the financial institution's CRA Statement and performance could be sent
to the appropriate federal supervisory agency or the institution, that
the public comment file was available for inspection, and that indivi-
duals or groups could request notice from the supervisory agency of
any applications filed by the institution with that agency.
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Assessing the Record
As part of a regular bank examination, the Agencies would evaluate
the institutions' record of helping to meet their entire communities'
credit needs. The regulations required that the assessment be based on
the CRA Statement and files as well as an institution's existing records
such as its HMDA data. Twelve specific factors were given as those to be
considered in assessing a financial institution's record (see appendix A).
The first group of three refer to an institution's efforts to communicate
with its community and incorporate the findings in its policies; the
next four "deal with evidence of practices which are or may be in conflict
with the purpose of the CRA." including violations of the ECOA, the
examination of HMDA data, and the record of branch office openings,
closings, and services. The branch office record can also indicate
some of a financial institution's effort to meet the credit needs of its
community, and the last group of factors includes examples of other
activities that could reflect attempts to help meet credit needs:
participation in local community development projects and the origination
or purchase of certain community-oriented loans, including government--
insured loans. Finally, the regulations include a recognition that the
list is not exhaustive and that activities a financial institution may
undertake may be limited by legal restrictions, size, economic conditions,
and other restraints.
Because the list of assessment factors was not considered the
only way financial institutions could respond to credit needs, the
Agencies refused to devise a weighting scheme for those listed.
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The final regulations repeatedly stressed the Agencies' "wish to
encourage innovative responses to community needs and ... read(iness)
to consider favorably any efforts to meet community credit needs." 2 7
Effect on Applications
Any deficiencies in CRA performance discovered during a routine bank
examination can be pointed out by the Agenciy, which can then encourage
the bank to improve. This, however, is not the chief enforcement
mechanism of the Act. The Congress required an institution's CRA record
of performance be considered when that institution seeks Agency approval
of an application for a deposit facility,28 and it is this application
and approval process that drives the CRA.
Almost any financial institution may someday seek approval of a
deposit facility application. Profits can be increased by doing a bigger
volume of business, and one way to increase volume is to establish more
branch offices or move present ones to more favorable locations.
Another option might be to acquire or merge with other financial insti-
tutions: an institution feeling the pinch of high interest rates and
increased competition may wish to be acquired by a more well-off concern.
In all these instances, the CPA record of performance must be considered
as the Federal banking agencies evaluate applications.
Each Agency has stated that it may use an institution's record of
CRA performance as the basis for denying a deposit application. State-
chartered institutions applying to receive Federal deposit insurance
must submit a proposed CRA Statement, and the appropriate Federal agency
would evaluate that, as well as consider the assessment of CPA performance
18
by the current state regulators.
The Agencies have retained the option of granting conditional
approval to applications, as well as outright approval or denial. In any
instance where the CRA recordis a "material factor" in an Agency's
deliberations, the Agency "will discuss the institution's record of
performance in its statement announcing its decision. ,29
Public Notice & Opportunity to be Heard
A major change in the regulations specifying the public's role in
deposit facility application procedures was also a result of the CRA.
Although not specifically required by the Act, the Federal banking
regulatory agencies amended their existing public notice and application
procedures in order "to provide greater public awareness of intended
actions by banks to which the Community Reinvestment Act is applicable."3 0
The revised regulations require financial institutions making
deposit facility applications to publish notice of such applications in
a general newspaper twice, instead of only once. Originally, the notice
was required to be published only in the community in which the applicant
proposed to do business; the new regulations require notice by publica-
tion in the following communities:
* for branches, the communities of the proposed branch and the
home office
* for relocations of home or branch offices, the communities of
the office to be closed, the office to be opened, and the
home office
* for charters and deposit insurance, the community of the
home office or proposed home office
* for acquisitions and mergers, the communities of each
home office.
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In addition, banks proposing to relocate must post notice of their
applications in the lobby of the affected office.
Opportunities for interested persons to comment on applications were
also clarified and expanded. The regulations allow anyone to comment on
an application by writing to the Regional Director of the appropriate
agency. Protests must be signalled by filing a written notice of intent
to protest with the Regional Director within the required number of days
after the last publication of the public notice. Those challenging an
application may submit data, comments, and information in writing, and
request a hearing on the application. All participants in a hearing
have the right to make presentations as well as rebut others'
presentations.
20
CHAPTER TWO
On 2 January 1980, the Massachusetts state banking commissioner
denied an application by the Provident Institution for Savings in Boston
to establish a branch in Newton. Because the denial was based on the
Bank's failure to fulfill the aims of the state CRA, it is an important
precedent. The Provident case gives an example of excellent work on
the part of a challenging community group, and a thoughtful decision by
the banking commissioner. It also illustrates some of the possible bank
responses to a CRA challenge.
The Massachusetts state CPA is identical to the Federal version
described earlier. The state banking commissioner, Gerald Mulligan,
adopted the Federal CRA as an administrative policy on 21 February 1979.
This move was initially viewed with some concern by anti-redlining
groups, because it replaced a stricter reinvestment standard which the
previous Dukakis-administration banking commissioner had established
through her executive authority.
The application was challenged by the Massachusetts Urban
Reinvestment Advisory Group (MURAG), which analyzed the Provident's
history of extending credit in Boston neighborhoods, prepared testimony,
solicited the support of local politicians and other community-based
organizations, and involved the press.
The Provident is the oldest and largest savings bank in the Common-
wealth. It has nearly $1 billion in assets, six downtown offices, four
neighborhood branches, and a branch in Saugus. The Bank had applied
for permission to branch into Newton in the previous year (1978),
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and had been turned down by then-Commissioner Carol Greenwald. Comr.
Greenwald in her written decision indicated that the Provident's
record of serving the credit needs of its community was "not impressive."
She also cited the Provident's dearth of conventional mortgages and
preponderance of FHA or VA mortgages in some Boston neighborhoods, the
low level of community outreach, its low overall loan to asset ratio
(54.4% as of 30 June 1978), and the non-representative composition of its
board of trustees.
MURAG's Challenge
In general, it was MURAG's contention that the Provident should be
aggressively and affirmatively ascertaining the credit needs of its
community's low- and moderate-income areas, and then working to address
those needs. Because of its size, an active role in participating in
urban lending and ccmmunity development projects should be expected, but
the Provident had not acted.
MURAG used many ,of Greenwald's points as the basis of its challenge
to the Provident's new branch application. Using HMDA data, they
tabulated the number and type of loans made by the Provident in every
Boston census tract in the year since its previous application. They
testified at the 13 November 1979 public hearing that the Provident had
given only 188 home mortgages--176 conventional, 12 government-insured--
in the period July 1978 to June 1979 (fiscal 1979). Of the $7,227,000
total value of those mortgages, they asserted that 35.9% was given as
mortgages in the well-off Beacon Hill-Back Bay sections of the city.
For the low- and moderate-income areas of Boston, MURAG cited these
22
figures for the same time period:
HOME
AREA MORTGAGES IMPROVEMENT LOANS
East Boston none 2
South Boston 4 2
Charlestown 8 none
Roxbury-Mission Hill 8 2
Even in the higher-income Dorchester neighborhoods of CedarGrove-Neponset,
where the Provident had a branch office, there were no mortgages and
only three home improvement loans.
The Provident had been cited in Greenwald's earlier denial as
having "a clear continuing predominance of FHA/VA loans in certain
inner-city neighborhoods." In the fiscal 1978 period she considered, the
Provident made 246 home mortgages--168 conventional, 78 government-
insured. In response to Greenwald's criticism, the Provident gave only
12 government-insured loans in the next twelve-month period. MURAG cited
this drop as "clear evidence that the Bank has little understanding of
the use of government-insured loans," but did not stress that the cutback
in government-insured loans had not been made up for by an increase in
conventional mortgages.
MURAG also attacked the Provident for its lack of community outreach
efforts. It characterized the Bank's community participation as "isolated,
one-shot efforts and not on-going commitments in helping meet local
community credit needs." Nor, it claimed, did the Provident make an
effort to ascertain the credit needs of low- and moderate-income com-
munities or attempt to target their marketing to reach those areas.
Finally, MURAG pointed out that Provident's aggregate loan to asset
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ratio of 54.4% (as of September 1979) was low when compared to other
Boston savings banks. Securties made up 37.7% of its portfolio, indi-
cating, MURAG claimed, "a lack of energetic involvement in mortgage
lending."
Provident's Case
In its application and testimony, the Provident cited its heavy
deposit outflow as the motivation to seek the more stable Newton deposits.
It also pointed to its support of traditional community activities as
edidence of its CRA performance. Later, they announced a bank reorgani-
zation that would improve their responsiveness to local credit needs.
The Provident stated that Newton residents had over $52 million
on deposit with it, and that establishing a branch in Newton would
thereby serve public convenience. It also claimed that competition
would be enhanced by their proposed branch, since over 90% of deposits
held by all financial institutions in Newton Centre/Newton Highlands
were held by only two financial institutions. Additionally, the
Provident asserted that its presence in Newton Centre would keep that
neighborhood shopping center viable.
Provident also stated that it sought the Newton branch as an oppor-
tunity "to obtain deposits apt to be more stable than some of the volatile
deposits we have generated from the Suffolk County (Boston) Marketplace."
As evidence of its need for such deposits, it claimed that Boston banks
had experienced a heavy deposit outflow which had not occurred at the
rest of Massachusetts banks: $75 million in deposits were lost by
the Provident in fiscal 1979. Even in the better times (1975-1977),
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the Provident noted, deposits in Suffolk County grew only 3.15%, while
Middlesex County banks (where Newton is located) had a- 14.55% increase.
As evidence of its lack of loanable funds, Provident cited its issuance
of $9 million worth of mortgage-backed bonds to compensate -for 'decreased
deposits.
The Bank also cited its work for the United Way, support of the
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and Neighborhood Housing Services, and
its speakers bureau as evidence of its involvement in CRA-related
activities. Its assertion that it also met some of its communities' needs
by sponsoring a girls softball team and a road race was mentioned in
almost every news account of the hearing.
On the last day of the two-week period for public comment after
the public hearing, the Provident submitted extensive supplemental
material in support of their application. In his cover letter to the
Commissioner, chairman and chief executive officer Garth Marston (a former
FHLBB member who was just appointed by the Provident in March 1979)
revealed a "major restructuring" of the Bank, the goal of which was
"to make the Provident more responsive to the credit and other financial
needs of the Community, including low- and moderate-income areas."
Items included in the reorganization were the establishment of a
credit and loan division, the purpose of which would be to "enable the
Bank to monitor lending activity more systematically and to formulate
lending policies which are more responsive to the credit needs of its
entire lending area." At the same time, branch managers would be given
more authority in loan processing and in responding to local requests
for financial assistance and expertise from community groups. The
marketing division was also to be strengthened in order to "improve
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the communicationof the Bank's saving and lending services through adver-
tising targeted to low- and moderate-income areas." In addition, the
new post of director of public affairs was created, with responsibility
to monitor all CRA activity and develop community outreach programs.
Already completed, but not yet analyzed, was a survey of real estate
brokers to discover ways the Bank could help prospective homebuyers.
Finally, the creation of neighborhood advisory boards, made up of
neighborhood representatives from all income levels, was announced.
The Provident also provided figures to rebut MURAG's loan numbers.
The Bank used total number of loans and their dollar volume to make the
following points: in fiscal 1979, the Bank wrote 429 new mortgages
totalling $27 million. While lending activity could be expected to
decline because of the deposit outflows thrift institutions experienced,
the Provident's lending activity in Boston declined only 18%, compared
with a 58% decline outside the city. One-third of its residential
mortgage portfolio represented properties in Boston. When its record of
lending in Roxbury, South Boston, East Boston, Charlestown, and Dorchester
was compared with that of four other big savings banks, the Provident
characterized itself as comparing "very favorably."
Mulligan's Decision
On 2 January 1980, Comr. Mulligan announced his denial of Provident's
branch application on CRA grounds. The denial was based solely on
Provident's record of performance, for Mulligan had early in his decision
found "the Newton Centre banking environment.. .capable of sustaining the
proposed Branch office."
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Mulligan noted that the CRA compliance examination "indicated
unsatisfactory performance on most of the assessment factors." Although
examination reports are confidential, Mulligan chose several pubically-
known Provident policies to illustrate its "unsatisfactory performance:"
its restrictive loan policies, its poor performance when compared with
peer banks, and the Bank's lending record in communities where it had been
allowed to branch. While Mulligan was impressed with MIURAG's analysis
(he was quoted as saying, "They are not amateurs,") - he chose to discuss
items not covered in MURAG's testimony.
First, he discussed Provident's restrictive loan application policies,
which he termed had a "chilling effect" on would-be borrowers. He cited
Provident's $100 mortgage loan application fee as being among the highest
of other large Boston savings banks surveyed; the non-refundable portion,
$50, was the highest among the surveyed banks. Examiners seeking applica-
tions at the Provident's ten branches found several branches with none
and one branch insisting on an address for the mortgaged property before
releasing an application form. Next, the Commissioner cited the Bank's
refusal to consider any 10% downpayment mortgages as evidence of
insensitivity to the credit needs of its low- and moderate-income
population.
In another comparison of the Provident and peer banks, the
Commissioner noted that Provident's 1-to-4 family conventional mortgage
loans in the Boston SMSA as a percentage of total assets ranked the lowest
of the four, "significantly lower than its three peers."
*
Massachusetts has the same assessment factors as the Federal banking
agencies. See Appendix A.
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Finally, Mulligan discussed Provident's record of lending in a
connunity after having opened a branch office in that community. In
three of four instances, the Provident had less money lent out in mort-
gages after one year of branch operation than before the branch was
established. "This pattern of disinvestment.. .compels a negative judgment
with respect to (the Bank's) comment to serving the credit needs of its
community."
The Commisioner took notice of Provident's reorganization plan and
praised the real estate broker survey as one way to end the Bank's
"apparent isolation from all levels of its community structure," en-
couraging the Provident to make "every effort to open channels of com-
munication with the community" as necessary for any alteration of its
lending practices. While the reorganization plan was judged not "concrete
enough to warrant approval" after its poor record of CRA performance, the
Commissioner indicated that should the Provident actually carry out the
plan and the commitments7 contained in it, future applications could be
approved.
Discussion
MURAG was instumental in lining up opposition to the application
in addition to preparing the substance of the challenge. Letters from
US Senators Kennedy and Tsongag Boston City Councilman DiCara, Lt. Gov.
O'Neil, St. Senators Brennan and Timilty and from community advocacy
groups such as United South End/Lower Roxbury Community Development Corp.
and Low Income Planning Aid were sent to the Commissioner's office urging
denial. MURAG was also largely responsible for the press coverage,
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which was mostly sympathetic.
MURAG took some risk in-grounding its challenge in former Comr.
Greenwald's previous denial. No one knew what to expect to expect from
Comr. Mulligan, but as the banking commisioner in a new, pro-business
administration, reference to Greenwald could have had an inflaming effect.
The quality of the Provident's preparation and testimony was very
poor when compared to MURAG's. The newspaper coverage of the hearing must
have been extremely embarrassing to the Bank. Why was the Provident so
ill-prepared?
One reason could be that they just didn't know what to expect about
CRA enforcement: the rules of branching applications had changed, and
they weren't prepared. But this view overlooks the fact that the
Provident had, only one year earlier, been sharply rebuked for its
lending patterns by Greenwald in her denial of a Newton branch. The
Provident didn't change as a result of that experience, and it is possible
that they believed the new King-administration banking commissioner would
be unlikely to demand improved performance or to turn their application
down.
Gerald Mulligan was an unknown factor when the application and
challenge were filed. He was assumed to reflect the pro-business
orientation of Governor King, either because he shared it, or would be
pressured into conforming with it. So why did Mulligan act as he did in
denying the application?
MURAG's impressive challenge and their effective use of outside
pressure created a difficult atmosphere in which to improve the appli-
cation, even if Mulligan had personally wanted to. But in denying the ap-
plication, Mulligan very carefully presented his own arguments for denial:
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there was no discussion of any of MURAG's points in the Mulligan decision.
Instead, he cited Provident's loan application policies and his own
analysis of the neighborhood branch performance as reasons for denial.
Thus, he astutely demonstrated his independence from the Governer and
pressuring community groups.
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CHAPTER THREE
This chapter describes eight more CRA-related cases and their
outcomes so that the reader may get a more complete picture than only
the Provident challenge would provide of how the CRA works. The material
for these cases came from regulatory agency documents, community group
newletters, and in large part, from newspaper accounts. The cases illus-
trate two of the kinds of applications covered under the CRA, some of
the methods of the Federal regulators charged with implementing and
enforcing the Act, the range of decisions those regulators can take
on applications, and the role of anti-redlining groups from across the
country in challenging applications and negotiating with banks.
Greater New York Savings Bank1
The first CRA denial was issued 23 April 1979 by the FDIC on an
application by the Greater New York Savings Bank (GNYSB) to establish
a Manhattan branch. The decision on the Brooklyn-based bank's application
was the first to be reached on a CRA-protested application by any Federal
regulatory agency.
The application had been challenged by South Brooklyn Against
Investment Discrimination (AID), which said that GNYSB had not met the
credit needs of the residents in its existing Brooklyn service areas, that
the Bank had "very stringent" lending terms, and that GNYSB had stifled
mortgage originations in favor of secondary market investments.
In November 1977, the Bank had announced an affirmative action
program for residential lending, in which it said it "accepts and sets as
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a target goal the annual investment of $25 million insound residential
mortgage loans in New York City." It had also agreed with AID and another
community group to set as a target $2.5 million in mortgage and home
improvement loans for two Brooklyn neighborhoods, and to spend $40,000
in those neighborhoods advertising mortgage availability.
On 5 September 1978, the New York State banking board approved the
*
application, and GNYSB went on to seek FDIC approval. FDIC hearings were
held in October (to put this in perspective, recall that the final regula-
tions were issued that same month). At its 10 January 1979 meeting, the
FDIC made no decision, probably because there was some doubt and hesi-
tation about granting a conditional approval, for fear of having the
conditions termed credit allocation.
Shortly after the 10 Jaunary no-action meeting, the Bank made the
following policy changes:
* reopened mortgage lending to non-depositors
* reduced the downpayment on 5-8 family residential mortgages
from 50% to 25 and 35%
* doubled the maximum size of FHA home improvement loans
to $15,000
* increased the maximum for all loans to $100,000 from
$75,000
* began to advertise the availability of mortgage loans,
installed a "Mortgage Action Phone" in the Bank lobby,
and published a description of its lending policy and terms.
On 23 April, approximately one year after the application was filed, the
FDIC met and denied it. The vote was 2 to 1, with the COC member favoring
approval. In the majority decision, the FDIC noted that GNYSB had taken
a series of positive steps, including advertising, contacts with real
*
See the discussion of savings banks in Chapter 4.
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estate brokers, and meeting with community groups. It also found that
the Bank's current lending terms, despite AID's contention, were generally
competitive with other Brooklyn banks. But the CRA record was "not
sufficiently favorable" to permit approval, because "the percentage of
the Bank's current flow of funds which is being committed to mortgages in
the Brooklyn area, though increasing, remains at a fairly low level."
Bank of Indiana2
The second denial of an application on CRA grounds was announced by
the Comptroller of the Currancy on 2 November 1979. This case is impor-
tant because the application was not formally challenged; the bank
examination process had extremely important role; and because the actions
and decision by the COC appear to set down one rule regarding policy
shifts by banks making applications.
The bank involved was the Bank of Indiana in Gary. The application
was for permission to merge the Bank with a shell bank corporation for
the sole purpose of allowing Money Management Corp. of Chicage to acquire
the 0.7% of Bank of Indiana shares it did not already own. This may
seem confusing, but it is very important. Technically, even though the
application was to combine an existing bank with a corporate shell, it is
considered a merger, and so it is subject to the provisions of the CRA.
Because of the nature of this type of merger, ther is no impact on
competition, and so the decision could be based on CRA issued alone.
There was no formal challenge to the application: the COC had two
years previously received a complaint by the Gary Human Rights Commission
alleging discriminatory lending practices on the part of the Bank. The
COC based its decision on its three bank examinations conducted between
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November 1977 and March 1979.
The COC stated that "the Bank's CRA record raises serious concerns,
and has been determined by this office to be less than satisfactory."
Specifically, the COC found serious deficiencies in Bank performance on
six of the twelve CRA assessment factors, no record of outstanding
performance on the other factors, and no evidence of any circumstances
that would "justify its failure to respond to credit needs in Gary, or to
inform Gary neighborhoods of the Bank's credit services."
The COC found that the Bank's efforts to ascertain the credit needs
and communicate with the residents of Gary's low- and moderate-income
communities were "extremely limited." (Assessment factors a & b: see
Appendix A)
The Bank had adopted 1 to 4 family mortgage terms that required 30%
downpayments, high compensating balances, and interest rates two points
above prevailing market rates. The Comptroller held that the effect of
such terms was to discourage mortgage applications, particularly from low-
and moderate-income persons (assessment factors d & i). The Bank's geo-
graphic distribution of credit extensions, applications, and denials
indicated
a consistent disparity in credit availability between the
city of Gary and its surrounding surburban communities....
In addition, for housing-related credit, there were dramatic
disparities between low- and moderate-income census tracts
and those with above-moderate household incomes.
(assessment factor e)
Finally, the COC felt that the Bank's loan terms and underwriting
criteria had a discriminatory effect on low- and moderate-income appli-
cants (assessment factor f). It cited the minimum loan size requirement
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for both commercial and residential loans, "excessively restrictive"
credit rating requirements, and the 990 square foot minimum dwelling
floor size for mortgages. It also cited a Bank history of uncorrected
ECOA violations.
The bank dropped some of the objectionable policies after filing the
application. It had also appointed a vice-president for Gary affairs;
made a commitment to make $10 million of credit available over the next
five years to qualified downtown Gary-area borrowers, subject to the
completion of a civic center complex and a US Steel office tower; and
indicated a willingness to consider particiapting in Gary's housing
rehabilitation program.
The promises were not enough. The COC pointed to the Bank's lack df
"firm commitment" and its "excessive contingencies" as reason for its
lack of confidence that the changes would result in a substantially-
improved performance. The decision laid down the following guideline:
such recent improvements may be valid considerations if,
and only if, they are of a significant magnititude, and
have been in effect long enough to demonstrate that they
are already strengthening the Bank's performance and should
eventually result in a satisfactory performance level. It
must be emphasized once again that token improvements or
policy changes undertaken immediately prior ro or during
submission cannot be construed as constitution good-faith
compliance with the spirit of CRA.
AmeriTrust 3
After an Ohio law permitting branching by merger went into effect
on 2 January 1979, the CleveTrust Corp. filed applications with the
Federal Reserve Board to merge three of its affliate banks into its lead
bank, Cleveland Trust. These and related applications were challenged
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by the Buckeye-Woodland Community Congress (BWCC), a Cleveland anti-
redlining group.
BWCC charged Cleveland Trust (the name of the holding company and
its anchor bank was subsequently changed to AmeriTrust) with discriminatory
lending practices, and cited destruction of loan applications, refusal
to permit persons to fill out applications, amd rejection of credit-worthy
applicants on the basis of race.
At a 27 December meeting of the FRB, the Board put off a decision
on the applications, and in a letter to AmeriTrust expressed its concern
"that AmeriTrust lending personnel may engage in practices that result in
the discouragement of creditworthy applicants." The letter included a
list of suggested changes the Bank could commit itself to in order
to "assure the Board of improved performance in the future." The
suggestions included:
* make publically-available the Bank's loan policies,
creditworthiness standards, and appraisal standards
* implement a non-discrimination training program for
lending personnel
* establish a credit counselling program
* keep a log of every loan inquiry by race, national
origin, other social factors, and disposition
* begin a public awareness program to inform the public
about these and other policies and services
The response of the AmeriTrust chairman Brock Weir denied any
discouragement of credit applications, but went-on
to the extent that our past record gives the impression
that any such policies exist, we wish to assure the Board
of our intention to correct-such sitoations-and to enhance
and develop training programs which will minimize their
occurances in the future.
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Weir balked at the log suggestion, claiming that it would cost $1.275
million a year and "would indeed constitute an undue and severe
penalty" if other banks were not required to do so as well.
The log was later imposed by the FRB as a condition of its approval
on 22 February 1980 of the AmeriTrust applications. The board imposed
the log because it found AmeriTrust's prescreening practices to be
"serious violations" of the ECOA. The FRB and its examiners found evi-
dence of prescreening at AmeriTrust's main office and three of the
seventeen branch offices sampled. Because of the evidence, the decision
said, it was "impossible to conclude with certainty that AmeriTrust had
not engaged in discouragement of applications from low- and moderate-
income areas."
Two of the seven FRB members felt that the log requirement was
"excessive" and lacked "sufficient supervisory value to justify the
costs to AmeriTrust."
Landmark4
In the first agreement reached under a FRB policy established after
the AmeriTrust protests, the Landmark Central Bank & Trust Company of
Wellston, Missouri and a Wellston community group affiliated with the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) negotiated
a settlement that led to the withdrawal of the Wellston group's challenge.
The group had protested an application by Landmark's holding company
to acquire another bank.
The FRB began the negotiation and mediation policy in an effort
to avoid the time-comsuming special examination procedures required when
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an application is protested. The FRB estimated that 2,600 man-hours were
needed for its CRA exams in the AmeriTrust protests. The policy attempts
to help clarify the contested issues and resolve misunderstandings among
the parties.
The Bank agreed to:
* provide funds to purchase and improve homes in the pre-
dominantly black Wellston
* make FHA loans at 4 of 1% less than the standard rate
* establish new credit standards and loan terms that were
more flexible and more appropriate to the Wellston
community
* hire a planning firm to prepare a redevelopment plan for
Wellston
* continue a job training program
* contribute $5,000 to aid re-establishment of the Wellston
Chamber of Commerce
* open its main office on Staurday mornings for a 90-day
trial.
Michigan National Corp.5
In another challenge before the FRB, the Board in December 1979
approved the application by the Michigan National Corporation, a
Bloomfield Hill bank holding company, to acquire five banks. The
application had been protested by the Michigan Committee on Law and
Housing. The Committee made the following charges regarding CRA per-
formance of Michigan National's nine banks:
* minimal efforts to communicate credit information
* a poor lending record in Detroit low- and moderate-income
communities
* gerrymandering of nearby low- and moderate-income areas
from the lending territory of one Detroit bank
* failure to comply with the technical requirements of the
CRA and HIMDA
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* making more housing-related loans in all-white Detroit
neighborhoods than in integrated ones
With regard to the last charge, the Committee stated that race seemed
to "play a major role" in lending patterns, and claimed that lending
fell drastidally "as soon as census tracts reached only 1 or 2% black
population." The Committee also stated that the nine subsidiaries made
only 29 conventional mortgage loans in all Detroit area low- and moderate-
income communities during 1976 to 1978.
In the 6 to 1 majority decision, the Board acknowledged that some
of the subsidiaries did not comply with the procedural requirements of
the CRA and IMDA, and went on to say
the Board views this noncompliance as a serious matters and
expects Applicant to take steps to ensure full and continuing
compliance with these requirements before consumation of these
proposals.
The Board also found that "far less housing-related credit was offered
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods than in the rest of Detroit
neighborhoods. While the Board attributed part of the disparity to lack
of demand, it also blamed Michigan National's "failure to determine
systmatically the credit needs of the Detroit area and the fact that its
advertising has been deposit rather than credit oriented."
The gerrymandering charge appeared unfounded once the total lending,
rather than only the housing-related pattern was considered, and no
racial discrimination appeared to exist, either. And, despite the
lack of housing-related credit in low- and moderate-income areas, the
subsidiary banks did participate in Small Business Administration programs
and hold bonds issued by the Michigan State Housing Development Authority.
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Three meetings between the Committee and Michigan National took
place as part of the FRB's policy to encourage negotiated settlements in
challenged applications. No settlement was reached.
First National Boston Corp.
The challenge of the First National Boston's proposed acquisition
of Southeastern Bank & Trust Co. of New Bedford is interesting because
it comes from a competitor, the First National Bank of New Bedford.
The FRB voted unanimously in February 1980 to allow the acquisition to
proceed.
First National New Bedford had charged that First National Boston had
an "utterly abysmal" lending record, and made five specific CRA-related
charges against the Boston bank:
* inadequate efforts to determine local credit needs
* closing of branches in low- and moderate-income Boston
neighborhoods
* mortgage loans were only a small percentage of its total
loans
* the draining of subsidiary banks' reinvestment funds by
requiring those banks to participate in First National
Boston loans.
The brief stated that First National Boston's ability to draw on its
subsidiaries' assets made it possible for local credit needs to be ignored
in favor of First National Boston's larger customers.
The FRB dealt with each First National New Bedford accusation. It
noted that the Boston bank had a community investment department and a
CRA policy committee. The branch closings did not leave the communities
without "an adequate source of credit or other banking services." The
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outflow of funds due to subsidiary participation. in First National Boston
loans was compensated by capital funds coming from the Boston bank.
The Board noted that First National Boston's mortgage loan volume
should increase since it had dropped it "depositors only" policy, and
stated that the ratio of loans to deposits in certain areas was not of as
much concern as evidence, which the Board found, of First National Boston
sensitivity to credit needs in those areas. The only suggestion for im-
proved First National Boston performance was for the Bank to seek out
and meet with community groups.
New England Merchants
Another negotiated settlement took place in Boston, between New
England Merchants National Bank and MURAG. The settlement was prospective
in that no challenge had been filed, and as part of the agreement MURAG
agreed not to challenge a merger between Merchants and another bank
holding company.
The agreement called for Merchants to devote 25% of its conventional
mortgage and home improvement funds to loans in Greater Boston low- and
moderate-income areas. It was estimated that this would result in about
100 more loans per year on 1 to 4 family structures than were previously
offered. Credit terms would not be affected by the agreement: one bank
official said,"We did not sign an agreement that will combat inflation."
Merchants also agreed to set up a loan counselling program, to
eliminate its $25,000 home mortgage minimum, to pay interest on tax
escrow accounts, and to emphasize small business loans.
The agreement also covered creditworthiness ratings, calling for
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all income, including part-time and overtime, of a loan applicant and
spouse to be considered effective gross income. For persons lacking a
credit history, bill payment and employment records would be used to
evaluate creditworthiness.
Finally, the contract provided for the monitoring by MURAG of
Merchants' compliance, and called for the bank and community-based
organizations to work together on projects.
Commerce Bancshares
The ofiy court case so far involving a challenged application does
not tell us much about how the courts will deal with the CRA. The case
involved the appeal by the Missouri ACORN of the FRB's conditional
approval of the merger of two Missouri bank holding companies. The US
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in October 1979 and
without comment, the FRB's action.
ACORN had charged that the Manchester Financial Corporation of St.
Louis had failed to meet its affirmative obligation to fulfill the credit
needs of the low- and moderate-income neighborhood in which its bank was
located. Commerce Bancshares, which was acquiring Manchester Financial,
made some general commitments as a condition to the merger:
* encouragement of mortgage applications in a 64-block
area of St. Louis
* newspaper and other advertisements of credit services
* a promise to keep experienced lending officers at the
Manchester
* a promise to continue meeting with community groups
ACORN wanted specific lending guidelines as a conditions for approval,
including 5% downpayment secured mortgages and 10% downpayment unsecured
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mortgages, all with 30-year maturities.
Because the CRA had been passed but not yet come into effect, the
FRB based its 16 June 1978 decision on the Bank Holding Company Act, and
stated that both bank holding companies met that Act's requirements.
Furthermore, that Act did not permit the Board to dictate credit services
or terms. ACORN filed suit on 12 September 1978, contending that the
Board had illegally disregarded lending performance standards required
under the CRA.
Summary
An anlysis of these and other challenges yields the following
points:
1. There have been only three denials of applications on CRA grounds.
The banking agencies are much more likely to give conditional approval
than to deny an application altogether, having overcome their initial
hesitation to grant conditional approvals. This change of emphasis--
from outright approval or denial to condtitional approval--has done
much to strengthen the Agencies' ability to encourage improved performance.
2. Conditions for approval imposed by the regulatory agencies have
avoided any requirement for certain types of credit offering or credit
terms because of their concern over having these requirements labelled
"credit allocation." Conditions imposed have mostly been requirements
to development affirmative advertising and marketing programs, public
disclosure of creditworthiness and underwriting standards, more meetings
between bank officials and community groups, the elimination of non-
-credit-related loan terms (such as minimum amounts and customer-only
rules), and the. implementation of CRA-related personnel training programs.
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3. Negotiated settlements, in contrast to agency-imposed conditions,
have focussed on the provision of certain kinds and amounts of credit
to specified areas. The New England Merchants' agreement is of this sort.
The regulatory agencies refuse to endorse credit allocation agreements,
but accept them as part of negotiated settlements leading to the with-
drawal of challenges.
4. Several standards of judging an applicants performance have emerged.
One is the comparison of the applicant's performance with that of peer
banks'. This was done in the Greater New York and Provident cases.
Another standard is the evaluation of the record of performance of the
applicant only on the assessment factors, as was done most clearly in
the Bank of Indiana and First National Boston challenges.
5. The banking regulatory authorities must balance the importance of CRA
considerations with other factors involved in evaluating an application.
The FRB appears willing to consider an applicants CRA record to be "only
part of the convenience and needs aspect," 9 to be evaluated along with
other factors such as competitive effects. The COC has reluctantly
approved a branch it would have otherwise denied on CRA grounds because
it felt that retaining the branch, which would have otherwise been closed,
was in the public interest. There has been no indication that the FDIC
and FHLBB would not take similar positions.
6. The banking authorities differ in their willingness to accept
commitments to improved performance as sufficient to justify application
approval. The FRB has noted that commitments can "outweigh adverse
aspects in a CRA record,"10 while the FDIC in its Greater New York
decision did not grant approval because the commitments had not yet
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resulted in large enough performance improvements. The Provident and
Bank of Indiana regulators fall somewhere between those two positions,
maintaining that without some evidence that altered policies have to some
degree already strengthened CRA performance, they could not rely on
promises of improved CRA performance.
Of the Federal regulators, I expect the FRB to be unlikely to ever
deny an application on CRA grounds. They have noted their belief that CRA
performance must be considered along with other factors and their willing-
ness to accept commitments to improve performance. They have been
innovative in setting up a negotiation policy and offering staff as
mediators. This desire not to deny applientions is not necessarily an
accommodation of the banking industry: securing CRA performance commit-
ments may be an effective and quick means of CRA enforcement. The FRB
requirement that AmeriTrust keep the loan inquiry log has demonstrated
that the FRB is not adverse to imposing stringent conditions to its
approvals.
The COC and FDIC have already demonstrated their willingness to
use denials as well as conditional approvals. The FHLBB has issued
conditional approvals, but has not seemed to rule out, as the FRB has,
the possibility of denials.
7. Community groups have a variety of roles connected to the CRA. As
advocates of neighborhood and community interests, they can be challengers
and negotiators. Challenges get the most attention and serve to establish
a group to be contended with. Community groups can be instrumental in
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lining up opposition to applications and arranging press coverage, but
challenges are time- and effort-comsuming and require an application to
have been filed. Negotiations allow the community group to extract
commitments from banks that the Federal agencies would not seek, and can
be conducted with almost any bank at any time. Finally, community groups
can help match banks with community development and reinvestment projects
that need assistance.
8. Not all challenges are brought by community groups. The First
National Boston challenge was an example of a competitor bank using the
CRA, and the Bank of Indiana denial is an instance of agency initiative.
9. Examiners play an important role in the CRA process. The COC denial
of the Bank of Indiana was a result almost entirely of its examination
findings. Exams substantiate or disprove challengers' allegations of
poor performance. In the Provident case, "undercover" examiners
discovered shortcomings in loan application availabilty.
10. Decisions on CRA-challenged applications are made by the Federal
banking authorities at the national level. The Washington offices
determine outcomes, not the regional administrators. This is an indica-
tion of how concerned the agencies are to show their good intentions
with respect to CRA enforcement. After having opposed the CRA when it
was being considered by Congress, they are now anxious to avoid charges
of undermining it through low-priority and low-status implementation
and enforcement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Several independent conditions could effect how often the CRA can
be invoked by community groups and how widespread its influence will
becomes. As I see them, there are four main areas of interest:
* the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act extension
* electronic facilities
* mutual funds, especially money market funds
* the response of financial institutions to economic
and regulatory conditions.
The H4DA extension will determine community groups' access to date nec-
essary for challenge preparation. In essence, the remaining three items
are factors that will affect the shape and functioning of the banking
community. There is a great deal of uncertainity about what the effects
of these changes will be: some will strengthen, others erode, the utility
of the CRA by community groups. It is important to understand what
these changes will be, and what will be their differential impacts on CRA
compliance.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
The immediate prospects of the CRA depend on the extension of HMDA
now being considered by Congress. Because of Congress' and the Agencies'
decision to use available data for monitoring CRA compliance, the HMDA
material a bank must annually prepare becomes an important means by
which bank examiners can evaluate CRA performance. The HMDA is even more
important to community groups, for it provides them the data on lending
patterns they need to check a financial institution's credit extension.
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The HMDA expires in June, 1980. The Federal Reserve Baord has
recommended a three-year extension, while the other Agencies have sup-
ported making HMDA a permanent requirement. Community groups want a
permanent HMDA and would like to see a broadening of its provisions to
include the small and non-SMSA financial institutions now exempted from
HMDA compliance.
CRA enforcement relies heavily on community groups' involvement,
and they in turn rely on HMDA data to document their application
challenges. Without an extension, would-be users of the CRA will have
to rely on the few state and local disclosure laws for data on lending
patterns. The alternative, when disclosure data is not available, of
canvassing neighborhoods to discover "unmet need" is time-consuming and
expensive. Disclosure data, particularly HMDA, is essential to the
enforcement of the CRA.
Electronic Facilities
The term "electronic facilities" can refer to both automatic teller
machines (ATM's) and electronic funds transfer (EFT). Off-premises ATM's
currently exist, and are already regulated by the banking authorities.
However, the federal regulators have differed in their interpretation
of whether the CRA applies to ATM's.
The FDIC has ruled that after a bank has applied for and met the CRA
review for an initial ATM, any subsequent units are exempt from review.
Also, ATM's shared by more than one bank are considered to be branches
only of the bank which owns the facility, so permission is not needed
to share a facility.1
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The CRA has caused the FHLBB to change its policy regarding off-
2
premises ATM's. Previously, the FHLBB had not required public notice
before the establishment of such facilities, but now it feels that the
words "facility with the ability to accept deposits," contained in Sec.
803(3)(c) of the Act, include off-premises ATM's. Savings and loans now
wishing to set up ATM's must go through the application and public notice
process as if they were establishing branches.
The second aspect of electronic facilities is electronic funds
transfer. As computer systems become larger and more reliable, EFT's
cashless and checkless society becomes possible. Instead of the check
validation machines now at stores, EFT will have a machine to send
signals that will actually deduct the price of the purchased goods from
the consumer's bank account and credit the same amount to the store's
account. Already some banks offer pay-by-phone services which allow
customers to phone their bill-paying transactions: this is essentially
EFT, albeit on a small, voluntary scale.
EFT is that banking of the future. The result of EFT will be the
extension of most banking services to any place equipped with a computer
terminal. Banking will no longer be the geographically fixed act it now
is for most consumers. The need for bank branches will be sharply
decreased, as consumers need only to go to a bank to open an account
or initiate a loan: this will result in a decrease of branch applications
to which the CRA would apply. Indeed, whether the CRA applies to EFT at
all is doubtful. Certainly, EFT will not become a reality without legis-
lation from Congress and oversight by the banking regulators, but the
"every supermarket a bank" EFT world will come swiftly once approved,
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and the CRA's place in such a world must be considered by the Congress
before that occurs.
So electronic facilities' effect on the CRA is uncertain. Uncertain
in the near future because different financial institutions will be
regulated differently when they wish to set up automatic teller machines.
The long-term effect of electronic facilities on CRA will surely be that
of electronic funds transfer, and no one knows how CRA considerations
will be incorporated into planning for that sort of banking situation.
Money Market Funds
If a bank and a savings and loan where each asked to name its
toughest competitor, neither would likely cite the other: instead, both
would point to money market mutual funds. The assets of the money
market funds have grown tremendously, largely with money that had been
on deposit with the banks and savings and loans. It has been estimated
that Massachusetts financial institutions, for example, lost $1 billion
in assets to the mutual funds in 1979.3 This siphoning off of bank and
savings and loan assets leaves those institutions with less capital and
flexibility to meet their community reinvestment obligations.
Though there has been some shift in the bank/money market fund
balance, it is unlikely that any of those lost deposits will return to
the banks. Despite the lessening of the prime rate and aggressive
competition to serve smaller investors, banks are still handicapped by
the nature of their liabilities and deposit interest rate ceilings. Even
though the Depositary Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (the banking reform act, for short) phases out the interest
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ceilings, it does so very slowly over a six-year time period. The
average passbook saver will see only a 4 of 1% interest rate increase by
September 1981.
Perhaps money market funds would demur at any likening of their ac-
tions or responsibilities to those of banks, but their free checking and
low initial investment make them look very much like regular bank
accounts. Should they be obliged to fulfill any community credit needs?
The banks and savings and loans certainly think so. Those institutions
see themselves as struggling under the disadvantage of maiximum interest
rate ceilings and restrictions on the types of investments they are
allowed to mAk-, with the added responsibility of meeting community credit
needs. Money market funds have no such restrictions, and in fact, feel
required only to seek the highest possible return for their investors.
They argue that the short-term nature of their investments does not allow
for meeting longer-range community credit needs. "The funds seek tempor-
ary parking places for their investors' dollars," is how one mutual
fund employee explained the situation.
The banks are even more emphatic about the CRA duties of money market
funds that apply for banking privileges. The Federal banking regulators
have ruled that trust companies which do not "perform commercial or
retail banking services.. .other than as an incident to their specialized
5
operations..." are not covered by the CRA. The Massachusetts-state
banking commissioner has indicated that he believes the state CRA applies
to one money market fund, Fidelity Management & Research Corporation,
which is seeking a banking charter to complement its mutual funds'
services. Fidelity disagreed, stating that it intended to offer fiduciary
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trust services, adding traditional banking services only if requested
to do so by its customers. While Fidelity has since agreed to file a
proposed state CRA statement, they will not be required :to-do so-under
the federal CRA for federal deposit insurance. 6
In summary, there are several areas where money market funds and
the CRA converge. First banks and savings and loans are having a more
difficult time meeting their CRA responsibilities as their depositors
withdraw their money to invest in money markey funds. Then there is the
argument that money market funds are, in effect, unregulated banks, and
should be obliged to meet community reinvestment needs. Finally, must
any money market funds that might actually seek a banking charter be con-
sidered to be admitting its true banking nature and thus be required to
fulfill CRA responsibilities?
Regulatory and Economic Conditions
Various financial institutions are being faced with regulatory
constraints from which they seek relief. While these constraints are
not directly related to CRA performance, actions taken by a financial
institution can effect how its CRA record is evaluated. I am referring
to financial institutions' opportunity to alter their legal status, and
thereby switch their Federal banking supervisors. I will discuss two
examples: state-chartered mutual savings banks seeking Federal charters,
and banks dropping their Federal Reserve membership.
Mutual savings banks, until recently, could exist only in those
seventeen states that chartered them. Most sought Federal deposit
insurance and so were regulated by the FDIC as well as the state banking
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authorities. State laws limiting the kinds of services the savings banks
could offer and their freedom to branch are common. For example, New York
State permits a savings bank to establish one branch a year. Should a
savings bank wish to take advantage of a branching opportunity, it would
have to seek permission from both the state and FDIC regulators. The
banks could only complain about service restrictions and applications
delays, but now they have an option. The Financial Institutions Regulatory
Act of 1978 provides for Federal chartering of mutual savings banks by the
FHLBB. Federal chartering would allow unlimited branching and one-stop
regulation, since the FHLBB would both charter and provide deposit
insurance. The Federal charter option has been enhanced by the recent
passage of the banking reform act, with its provisions for new investment
and trust powers for savings banks.
Several mutual svaings banks have applied for Federal charters, among
them the New York Bank for Savings, the fourth largest mutual in the US.
No conversions have been approved yet, and it is not clear whether the
mutuals are not just using the Federal chartering option as a means to
force their state regulations to liberalize their savings bank laws.
The Federal Reserve Board's reserve requirement has been a major
banking topic for the last year. The FRB makes its member banks keep on
deposit with it a certain percentage of their assets. Because the FRS
pays no interest on these accounts, the member banks felt they were losing
earnings, and some began to drop their membership, thereby going from
FRB to FDIC supervision. The bank debate has been silenced by the passage
of the banking reform act, which requires all financial institutions,
whether FRS members or not, to set up reserve accounts with the FRS.
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There are probably more instances of financial institutions being
able to switch Federal supervisory agencies. Even though the Agencies
jointly issued the CRA regulations and examiner guidelines, differential
interpretation and application of the CRA by the Agencies could induce
financial institutions to include regulatory CRA enforcement into their
decision-making.
The economic climate affects the number and type of CRA-covered
applications that will be made. Requests to merge with or acquire another
financial institution and to branch can be expected to be the bulk of
the CRA-related applications. There are several ways current conditions
can affect the rate of those applications.
The interest rate hike is making some financial institutions seek
mergers as a way to increase deposits and lessen their portfolios'
concentration of olderlower-interest loans. The banking reform act
allows savings and loans and savings banks to offer checking accounts and
investment and trust services. These changes give all financial institu-
tions essentially the same banking powers, and requires all of them to
seek customers in the same market. The increased competitive pressures
will be too great for some financial institutions and they will have to
be acquired by or merged into other institutions. There are even predic-
tions of mergers between commercial banks and thrifts. The trend in
banking will be toward larger financial institutions as the smaller,
independent ones disappear.
There is not such a clear trend visible when discussing branching.
Certainly mergers will result in more branch offices for the institution
involved. Banking associations are lobbying for the repeal of state
banking prohibitions or limitations, but there is some evidence that
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banks may not be in a rush to take advantage of any changes.8 The
high cost of establishing branches and the poor earnings outlook have
been cited as reasons for the hesitation. Automatic teller machines may
provide a cheaper alternative to branches and, as discussed, have a
different application process in some instances.
Conclusion
Different time frames must be considered when discussing CRA
prospects. The most immediate consideration is the HMDA extension. With-
out an extension, CRA enforcement through application challenges will be
greatly set back.
For the near future, the financial condition of the Janking industry
is likely to lead to a flurry of mergers and acquisitions and mergers,
giving CRA activists a lever with which to force CRA compliance. The
money market funds can be expected, at the same time, to continue to
attract investors away from the banks, leaving the banks and CRA advocates
with less money to devote to community reinvestment. The 1980 banking
reform act's phasing out of deposit rate controls over six years' time
will not do much to help the banks with their deposit problems.
By the time electronic funds transfer becomes prevalent, few of the
premises on which CPA enforcement depends will any longer exist: there
will be little need for banks to establish branches, and most merger
activity will already have been completed. Other strategies for community
reinvestment will have to be developed.
Certainly, the CRA is and will continue to be, a powerful tool for
community advocates now and for the next five or so years. The use of
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the CRA can be strengthen for these groups by including credit unions in
its coverage and making the examiners' reports public.
The CRA is a flexible tool as well. Community advocacy groups can
use it to confront banks before regulators, or to provide a framework in
which to negotiate with banks about meeting community credit needs. The
emphasis of its users can go beyond the ill effects of redlining to
efforts to achieve help for community economic development projects.
Recognition must be made of the possibility of a shift, over time, in
credit needs from urban to rural low- and moderate-income communities.
CRA can be used to force financial institutions to reconsider their
charity policies and priorities: an increasing number are likely to con-
tribute money and expertise to community development ventures. Finally,
while everyone working with the CRA realizes its potential for dis-
placement, the issue has been infrequently addressed. How can neighbor-
*
hood reinvestment and avoidance of displacemnt both be part of the CRA?
In five to ten years after the enactment of the CRA in 1977, I
believe it will be technically obsolete, largely because the banking
industry as we know it will have changed so much. Banking regulatory and
economic conditions will all serve to weaken the CRA, because the CRA
as it is presently written will cover less and less of the decision
environment. What will follow the CRA?
The cases and analysis have shown the CRA to be important and
effective in promoting bank recognition of community credit needs and
involvement in neighborhood reinvestment and development. This
*
MURAG was involved in one project in which a bank donated technical
assistance and waived costs in arranging financing to enable tenants to
take over their building as a co-op, averting a conversion to condominiums.
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effectiveness depends, however, on a set of banking conditions that
cannot be expected to continue. Economic and technological changes, such
as the advent of electronic funds transfer, will alter the banking
industry. This could begin a new sequence of post-CRA Federal reinvest-
ment legislation and regulation.
Alternatively, there may be no need for statuatory follow-up to
the CRA. The planning catchword for the Eighties seems to be
"partnerships." Banks and community-based organizations could lean from
their CRA experiences how to sit down and work together toward community
reinvestment. Together the banks and community groups could utilize
goverment programs or lobby for appropriate programs. This mutual under-
standing of the business and mission of banks and community groups can
be one of the most lasting accomplishments of the CRA.
57
APPENDIX A
CRA ASSESSMENT FACTORS
(a) Activities conducted by the bank to ascertain the credit needs of
its community, including the extent of the bank's efforts to communicate
with members of its community regarding the credit services being
provided by the bank;
(b) The extent of the bank's marketing and special credit-related pro-
grams to make members of the community aware of the credit services
offered by the bank;
(c) The extent of participation by the bank's board of directors in
formulating the bank's policies and reviewing its performance withstespect
to the purposes of the Community Reinvestment Act;
(d) Any practices intended to discourage applications for types of
credit set forth in the bank's CRA Statement(s);
(e) The geographic distribution of the bank's credit extensions, credit
appliations, and credit denials;
(f) Evidence of prohibited discriminatory or other illegal credit
practices;
(g) The bank's record of opening and closing offices and providing
services at offices;
(h) The bank's participation, including investments, in local development
and redevelopment projects or programs;
(i) The bank's origination of residential mortgage loans, housing
rehabilitation loans, home improvement loans, and small business or small
farm loans within its community, or the purchase of such loans originated
in its community;
(j) The bank's participation in governmentally-insured, guarantee, or
subsidized loan programs for housing, small business, or small farms;
(k) The bank's ability to meet various community credit needs based
on it financial condition and size, and legal impediments, local economic
conditions and other factors; and,
(1) Other factors that, in the Agencies judgment, reasonably bear upon
the extent to which a bank is helping to meet the credit needs of its
entire community.
APPENDIX B
TABLE OF CASES DISCUSSED
Bank (Location) Challenger Agency Application Outcome
Provident (Boston)
Greater New (Brooklyn)
York Savings Bank
Bank of Indiana (Gary)
AmeriTrust
Landmark
(Cleveland)
(Wellston, Mo)
Michigan Nat'l (Bloomfield
Hills)
Mass. Urban
Reinvestment (MURAG)
So. Brooklyn Against
Investment (AID)
Discrimination
none
Buckeye-Woodland
Community Congress
Assoc. of Community
Organizations for
Reform Now
Michigan Committee
on Law & Housing
Mass. Banking
Commissioner
FDIC
COC
FRB
FRB
FRB
branch
branch
merger
branch,
merger
merger
merger
denied
denied
denied
conditional
approval
negotiated
settlement
approved
New England
Merchants
Commerce
Bancshares
(Boston)
(Kansas City,
Mo)
noneMURAG
ACORN FRB
none
merger
prospective
negotiated
settlement
approved, upheld
on appeal
! -9
oo
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